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Recent Decisions
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-MARKETABLE

TITLE-ENCROACH-

Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for the purchase by defendant from plaintiff of a seven-story
apartment house on Manhattan Avenue and ii6th Street, Borough of Manhattan. The apartment house was so constructed that
several rows of bay-windows and the store show-windows extended beyond the building line, each one foot, and the stoop four
feet, said encroachments being under express permission from the
building department which permission was still in full force. On
the closing day, defendant refused to accept the deed tendered by
plaintiff on the ground that these encroachments into the street
line made the title unmarketable. In a suit brought by plaintiff for
MENTS ON

STREEr.

specific performance, HELD, that, as the City authorities could

at any time rescind the permission under which these encroachments were made and compel their removal, they rendered plaintiff's title unmarketable, and defendant could not be forced to
take it (Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N. Y., 495.)
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The purchaser in a sale of real estate is entitled to a marketable
title (Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y., 535; Delevan v. Ducan,49
N. Y., 485), and if the title is unmarketable specific performance,
of course, will not be decreed. A marketable title is one that will
enable the vendee to hold his land in peace, and if he wishes to
sell it to be reasonably sure that no flaw or doubt will arise to
disturb its market value. (Vought v. Williams, 12o N. Y., 253;
McPherson v. Schade, 149 N. Y., 16). Conflicting views of the
New York Courts concerning the validity and effect of municipal ordinances allowing street encroachments under certain
restrictions (Wormser v. Browun, 149 N. Y., 163; Broadbelt v.
Loew, 15 App. Div., 343, affd. on opinion below in 162 N. Y.,
642; Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y., 353; City of New York v.
Rice, 198 N. Y., 124-; see also opinion below in Acme Realty
Co. v. Schinasi, 154 App. Div., 397) need not be considered here.
Granting that the encroachments in this case were constructed
lawfully and that they are lawful at the present time (Code of
Ordinances of The City of New York, Chap. 23, Sec. 163), still
the City can require their immediate removal at any time by rescinding the permission given, and if not unlawful at the presefit
time they would become so at once upon such rescission (Code
of Ordinances, Supra.; City of N. Y. v. Rice, Supra; Greater
New York Charter, Sec. 5o; Deshong v. City, 176 N. Y., 475)Recent action by the city government in similar cases, confined
at present however to principal thoroughfares, renders such
action reasonably to be anticipated. It would appear then that
the Court was right in refusing to compel specific performance.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the principal case
reaches a directly contrary result from that of the same Court
in Broadbelt v. Loew, Supra, decided in i9oo. The facts in the
two cases were similar with this exception: in the Broadbelt
case it was stated that action by the municipal authorities to conipel the removal of street encroachments was too remote a possibility to be considered, while in the Acme Realty case the Appellate Division made a finding that such action was reasonably to
be looked for; and Werner, J., writing for the Court, explains
the two cases on this ground. Loew in 19oo was compelled to
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accept a title which today he could not force on an unwilling
vendee. We have here an example of predicating property rights
on a variable basis such as the policy of a city government.
When it is considered that a great majority of the buildings
within the city limits have street encroachments similar to those
in the principal case, it seems that the decision may have con-.
siderable effect upon real estate transactions.

FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS-ILLEGAL

DIVIDzNDs-RIGHT

TO

SuE. Plaintiff, a New Jersey Corporation, transacts its principal business in New York, having obtained its certificate pursuant to Sections 15 & i6 of the N. Y. General Corporation Law.
In its corporate name it sues a director who participated in the
declaration of dividends out of the capital stock. HELD, the corporation could sue in its own name in this state, though New
Jersey, where it was chartered gave the right of action to the
stockholders (German American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N. Y.,

57).
The Legislature has the power to impose conditions under
which a foreign corporation shall transact business within this
state (Sinnott v. Hanan, 214 N. Y., 454; Lockwood v. U. S.
Steel Corp., 2o9 N. Y., 375). Foreign corporations may be excluded altogether, unless they be federal instrumentalities (Phoenix Mitual Life Ins., Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S., 63) or be engaged in foreign or interstate commerce (People v. Wcmpie,
131 N. Y., 64). The internal affairs of a foreign corporation
must be left to the state of its origin (Southwortk v. Morgan,
205 N. Y., 293).
The General Corporation Law of New Jersey prohibits directors from declaring dividends except from the surplus or
net profits arising from the business of their corporations. For
a violation, the directors are made jointly and severally liable
to the stockholders, or in case of insolvency, to the corporation
or its receiver (Section 30). The New York statute prohibits
the same act, but gives the right of action to the corporation
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or its creditors (Stock Corporation Law, Sec. 28). This section
applied only to domestic corporations. (Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 14o N. Y., 563; Lane v. Wheelhright, 69 Hun, i8o). But
Sec. 70, as added by the Laws of 1897, Ch. 384, extends the
privilege to foreign corporations. It provides that "the officers,
directors and stockholders of a foreign corporation doing business in this state, except moneyed or railroad corporations, shall
be liable under the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as the officers, directors and stockholders of a domestic corporation (i) for the making of unauthorized dividends

* *

*

Such liabilities may be enforced

in this state in the same manner as similar liabilities imposed by
law upon officers, directors and stockholders of a domestic corporation." Whether the dividend is unauthorized depends upon
the law of thTe state which chartered the corporation (Hutchinson v. Stadler, 85 A. D., 424). If the dividend is unauthorized
by the law of the corporate origin, the directors are made liable
under the statute of New York and this liability may be enforced in the same manner as similar liabilities upon directors
of domestic corporations. This liability is enforced by the domestic corporation or its creditors. Section 70 does not merely
declare a rule of comity; it extends to foreign corporations, doing business in this state, the prohibition against illegal dividends
in favor of domestic corporations set forth in Section 28 and
it provides a new remedy by which foreign corporations may enforce this prohibition; it reinforces the New Jersey prohibition
with a new sanction and a new remedy (reversing 167 A. D.,
928, and overruling de Raismes v. U. S. Lithographic Co., 161
A. D., 781). This conclusion is confirmed by a reference to the
Penal Law, Section 664, which makes it a misdemeanor for directors to declare dividends except from surplus profits. Section

667 provides that it is no defense that the corporation is a foreign one, if it is engaged in business or keeps an office therefor
in.this state.
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MASTER AND SERVAN.T-NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO EMPLOYEE!
IN TUNNEL BY FALLING ROCK-WHEN DOCTRINE OF SAFE
PLACE TO WORK NOT APPLICABLE. The defendant had a con-

tract for the construction of the Catskill Aqueduct. Plaintiff
was a "mucker"-one whose duty it was to load cars with loose
and broken rock from the floor of the tunnel for removal therefrom. In the course of this occupation he was injured through
the fall of a piece of rock from the roof of the tunnel, after a
squad appointed for the purpose had "scaled" the said roof of
loose rock subsequent to the detonation of a trimming-blast.
The trial judge in his charge submitted to the jury the question
of the defendant's negligence in not providing for plaintiff a safe
place to work: under the instruction that failure so to provide
rendered it liable: The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Orr
appeal. HELD: That the Common Law Doctrine of safe place
to work does not apply to the facts of the case, and that the error
of the Trial Court in submitting the question to the jury required
reversal. (Mekki v. Halbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corporation,
168 App. Div., 719.)
The Common Law Doctrine that a master cannot avoid or
delegate the responsibility of providing for his servant a safe
place to work, is well supported by decisions throughout the
United States. (Dumas v. Walville Lumber Com'pany, 64
Wash., 381, 116 Pac., io9i; Graaf v. Vuican Iron Works, 59
Wash., 325, 1O9 Pac., l116; Bernheimrn Bros. ,. Bager, iog
Md., 551-561; White v. NutrilineMilling Co., 63 So., 385; Raxr
woorthy v. Heisin, 191 Ill. App., 457.)
Courts in the State of New York, however, have strictly declined to permit the application of that rule, where the inherent
dangers obtaining in the work, render evident an assumption of
risk on the part of the workman (De Vito v. Crage, 165 N. Y.,
378, also 74 App. Div., 33), or where the very prosecution of the
work itself, creates the place and causes the danger. (Citrone v.
O'Rourke, EngineeringConstructionCo., 188 N. Y., 339; Henry
v. Hudson & ManhattanR. R. Company, 201 N. Y., 14o.)
The Appellate Court distinguishes the principal case from one
of its recent decisions, wherein a successful plaintiff in similar
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employment was injured by falling rock, while removing debris
from the tunnel sixty feet back from the heading. (Bitolio v.
Bradley ContractingCompany, i66 App. Div., 836.)
Unfortunately for purposes of review, the Court assigned no
reason whatever for such distinction. It would seem that to
draw an anology between the Bitolio case and the principal case,
would not have been as forced a construction as the ruling of the
Court by which it placed the principal case on the side of the
Henry case and the Citrone case (Supra.). Since the doctrine
that "When the work makes the place and creates' the danger"
has received herein application to a set of facts distinguishable
from those cases which it has formerly governed, it is submitted
that the decision is unsound.

REAL

PROPERTY-TENANCY

BY THE ENTIRETY-ATTEMPT

A husband, in order to avoid a transfer tax on his
estate, conveyed his real property directly to himself and his
wife, as tenants by the entirety. HEL: that such a conveyance
merely created a tenancy in common. (Matter of the transfer
tax on the estate of John C. Klatzl, deceased, New York Court
of Appeals, N. Y. Law Journal, Oct. 20, 1915.)
At common law a conveyance by a third person to a husband
and wife creates a tenancy by the entirety. (Jackson v. Stevens,
i6 Johns., iio.) This estate exists by virtue of the common law
principle of the unity of husband and wife. (2 Kent's Comm.,
p. 132.) That principle was not abrogated by Sec. 56 of the
Dom. Rel. Law permitting husband and wife to convey directly
to each other, or by the other statutes removing married women's
disabilities: any statute having that effect would simultaneously
destroy the estate of tenancy by the entirety. (Stelz v. Shreck,
128 N. Y., 263, 266.)
Nor can it be a joint tenancy merely
because it fails to be a tenancy by the entirety. Though both
have many similar attributes, they are not the same either in
substance or in form (Stelz v. Shreck, Supm). A conveyance
to two or more persons unless expressly declared to be a joint
TO CREATF
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tenancy, creates a tenancy in common (Real Property Law, See.
66). The time honored unities would appear to be violated in
such a conveyance as this, as the husband always continued to
own the property. Accordingly it has been held in a lower
Court (Saxon v. Saxon, 46 Misc., 202) that the statute enabling husband and wife to convey to each other, abrogates the
rule of marital unity, in regard to conveyances made under it.
Judge Collin's dissenting opinion in the principal case presents
the interesting proposition that the husband conveyed from himself as one legal person to himself and wife as another, but this
distinction appears to be somewhat fine-spun. Judge Bartlett's
concurring opinion seems to misapprehend the true nature of
tenancy by the entirety. The prevailing opinion would appear
to be the sounder, and it is certainly more in accord with the established law. (Bertles v. Numn, 92 N. Y., 152, 159.)

HUSBANDS LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S NECESSARIES--CONSTRUCTION oF CONTRACT. A husband and wife contracted in writing,

that in consideration of the husband's refraining from attempting to obtain a place on the police force (to which the wife was
strenuously opposed) the wife would pay to her husband, during
his lifetime, quarterly installments of an annual income which
she was receiving, amounting to $1oooo. The agreement further provided that nothing .therein contained should obligate the
husband to pay the debts or other obligations of the wife, which
she agreed would be paid by her out of her property. In an action by the husband to recover two installments which had fallen
due under the said agreement, HELD, that the contract imported
a good consideration, was valid, and that the plaintiff might recover. (Werner v. Werner, Appellate Division, 154 N. Y.
Supp., 570.)

It was contended on the part of the defendant that the agreement by its terms, relieved the husband from the duty imposed
upon him by the law to support his wife. This construction, if
correct, would invalidate the contract, being contrary to Section
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51 of the Domestic Relations Law (chapter 14, Consol. Laws;
chapter 19, Laws i909), which provides that "a husband cannot
relieve himself from his liability to support his wife by contract
with her."
A husband is obliged to supply his wife with necessaries,
which are his own debts; but he is not obliged to pay any debts
contracted by his wife which are not for necessaries and which
he has not expressly authorized her, as his agent, to contract.
(Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb., 558; Wanamaker v. Weaver,
176 N. Y., 75.) The husband was not legally obligated to assume the liability for his wife's personal debts. The agreement
by its terms did not obligate him to assume them. The husband's
obligations to supply his wife with necessaries, being his own
personal debt, the contract did not affect that obligation. The
contract affected only the debts and obligations of the wife. The
liability of the husband for debts incurred forhis wife's support, being his, and not the wife's, she clearly could not contract
with him, to relieve him, of obligations never legally incurred
by her. It is submitted that the decision herein is sound.

CARRIERS-LIABILITY OF CONSIGNEE-LAWFUL RATES. Plaintiff, a common carrier, delivered goods to defendant, under a bill
of lading which designated defendant as consignee. Defendant
paid the charges asked, which, in fact, were erroneously cornpufed by plaintiff. Fifteen months later the plaintiff discovered
its mistake and demanded the additional sum, as the lawful
charge under the Interstate Commerce Act. Held: that plaintiff
could recover; that defendant was the presumptive owner and
could not prove his agency to the consignor. (Pennsylvania
R. R. v. Titus, 216 N. Y., 17.)
A consignee is the presumptive owner of goods consigned to
him, if he receives them without communicating to the carrier
his true relation of factor or agent. By accepting the goods he
becomes bound to pay the unpaid legal charges of transportation.
(Sweet v. Barney, 23 N. Y., 335; White v. Schweitzer, 147
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A. D., 544.) The obligation arises from the presumptive ownership, the acceptance of the goods and the services rendered and
benefits conferred by the plaintiff for charges made and to be
paid.
Payment of freight charges was made by the bill of lading,
a condition precedent to delivery to the consignee. By his acceptance, the law implies a promise on his part to pay the lawful
charges. He made himself a party to the contract with the consignor or entered into an original contract to pay, which took
the place of the right of the plaintiff to retain the property until
charges were paid. (Hinsdell v. Weed, 5 Den., 172; Davidson
v. City Bank, 57 N. Y., 81.) The rates fixed by the Interstate
Commerce Act are arbitrary, and immutable by agreement or
mistake of the parties. (Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v.
Maxwell, 237 U. S.,.94.) Hence there can be no estoppel against
the plaintiff: it could not, by its act, intentional or unintentional,
relieve the defendant from the compulsory direction of the
Statute. The decision in the principal case seems a sound one.
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